In this paper, we consider some basic concepts behind the design of existing robust perceptual hashing techniques for content identification. We show the limits of robust hashing from the communication perspectives as well as propose an approach that is able to overcome these shortcomings in certain setups. The consideration is based on both achievable rate and probability of error. We use the fact that most robust hashing algorithms are based on dimensionality reduction using random projections and quantization. Therefore, we demonstrate the corresponding achievable rate and probability of error based on random projections and compare with the results for the direct domain. The effect of dimensionality reduction is studied and the corresponding approximations are provided based on the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma. Side-information assisted robust perceptual hashing is proposed as a solution to the above shortcomings.
INTRODUCTION: BASIC DESIGNS
Robust perceptual hashing was originally considered as an alternative to the classical crypto based hashing algorithms known to be sensitive to any content modification. The main distinguishable feature of robust perceptual hashing is the ability to withstand certain modifications while producing the same or at least very close (in a defined distance space) hash value. The applications of robust perceptual hashing are numerous and include content management (content identification, indexing and retrieval), content security (tracking of illegal copies, verification of authenticity, anticounterfeiting); it is used as well as assisting functionality for synchronization and alignment.
A common principle in the design of most of robust perceptual hashing is a mapping of the original data x to some secure but at the same time robust domain. This step is unavoidably accompanied by a dimensionality reduction also known as feature extraction:x = Wx,
where x ∈ R N ,x ∈ R L , W ∈ R L×N and L ≤ N and W = (w 1 , w 2 , · · · , w L ) T consists of a set of projection basis vectors w i ∈ R N with 1 ≤ i ≤ L. Such reduction of dimensionality is known as a soft hashing. The second step additionally uses a possibly key-dependent labeling or Grey codes to ensure the closeness of labels for vectors that are close. When only the most significant bit of the Grey code is used (achieved by a simple comparison with a threshold), it is known as binary or hard hashing.
The most simple quantization or binarization of extracted features is known as sign random projections:
where b xi ∈ {0, 1}, with 1 ≤ i ≤ L and sign(a) = 1, if a ≥ 0 and 0, otherwise. The vector b x ∈ {0, 1} L computed for all projections represents a binary hash computed from the vector x.
There are numerous examples of the use of a mapping W in robust perceptual hashing and we will only mention some of them: Fridrich 7 uses block-based random projections generated from the uniform distribution and compares the resulted scalars with the threshold that can be considered as the second level bitplane in the Gray labeling (to enhance the robustness the projection vectors/fields are low-pass filtered that corresponds to the extraction of low-pass coefficients from the data x); to enhance the security by randomized sampling Mihcak et. al. 18 use overlapping rectangles with the key dependent weights to compute the local statistics for further quantization (the overlapping rectangles can be also considered as the projection vectors/fields with zeros besides the support, where the random weights are generated, that makes them conceptually very close to Fridrich design); F. Lefebvre and B. Macq suggest to use Radon projections 12 ; Kalker at. al. 8 consider overlapping blocks for audio hashing.
The performance analysis of robust perceptual hashing was mostly performed using computer simulation. Therefore, there is a real need for a thorough investigation of the theoretical limits of robust hashing. The first efforts in this direction have been reported in. 3, 6, 16, 17, 24 However, the simultaneous impact of dimensionality reduction and binarization still remains uncovered in terms of both identification rate and average probability of error.
Another important aspect of robust perceptual hashing is security. The main belief behind the construction of good hashing algorithms was a randomization property, i.e., a good hash should have largest possible entropy. Swaminathan et. al. considered the entropy of different featured used in the state-of-the-art robust hashing algorithms 22 and later this analysis was extended to crypto-based measures such as the equivocation and the unicity distance.
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The main analysis is performed along the line of investigating transformations that are difficult to invert. This links the robust perceptual hashing based on non-invertible transformations with similar transforms applied in biometric database protection against impersonation attacks. At the same time, the growing number of publications in the recently emerged domain of compressive sensing demonstrates a possibility to accurately reconstruct some classes of sparse signals from low-dimensionality projections. 4, 20 This also raises certain security concerns about some transformations and their corresponding level of security.
No less important, the problem of robust perceptual hashing is related to the fact that the maximum number of sequences that can be generated by some source is about 2 NH(X) , where H(X) is the entropy of the source, exceeds the maximum number of reliably identifiable sequences under certain channel or acquisition distortions. The situation is inherently different to that in digital communications where the construction of the codebook is quite flexible. Therefore, in this paper, we will make an attempt to consider the basic construction of state-of-the-art robust hashing techniques, evaluate the loss in performance in terms of achievable identification rate and probability of error and suggest alternative design able to overcome the shortcomings of existing robust hashing methods.
SOURCE AND CHANNEL MODELS: DIRECT DOMAIN IDENTIFICATION CAPACITY AND PROBABILITY OF ERROR
To illustrate the limitations of robust perceptual hashing, we will refer to the identification setup in the scope of the classic communication framework where some sequence should be identified based on its noisy observation on the output of channel. We will assume that the source is memoryless and produces sequences that follow
Assuming N is sufficiently large, we will use the concept of typicality, 5 according to which the maximum number of uniquely distinguishable sequences is limited by M ≤ 2 NH(X) .
The robust hashing in the communication framework can be represented as in Figure 1 . All sequences generated by the above source are indexed by the index m, 1 ≤ m ≤ M . The sequences are communicated via a channel. We will assume the channel to be discrete memoryless channel (DMC), which is characterized by
. This channel is characterized by some capacity C id . The decoder has to establish the index of input sequence x based on the channel output y. The practical implementation of the corresponding identification scheme based on robust hashing described in Section 1 is shown in Figure 2 . 
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Figure 2. Robust hashing based identification with the corresponding identification capacities at each stage of processing.
Direct domain identification capacity
To estimate the maximum achievable errorless identification rate for the above channel p Y|X (y|x), we will use the notion of identification capacity C id defined as:
where I(X; Y) is the mutual information between the input and output of channel 25 † . Accordingly, the maximum number of reliably distinguishable sequences on the output of such a channel is limited by 2 NC id . Since, the identification capacity (3) is upper bounded by:
and for the case of i.i.d. sequences it means that the number of sequences that can be distinguished is reduced by about 2 NH(X|Y ) due to the channel distortions. Therefore, the channel loss H(X|Y ) plays an essential role for the identification that will be addressed in our further analysis.
We demonstrate it on the example of i.i.d. Gaussian statistics assuming X ∼ N (0, σ 2 X I N ). The differential entropy of this source is h(X) = 
† Note the difference with the channel capacity C = max p X (x) I(X; Y ), where the maximization is performed with respect to the channel input distribution, which is more flexible compared to the considered fixed input distribution identification setup.
where ρ
represents the conditional entropy with σ
. This variance also corresponds to the variance of minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimator of x based on y.
This situation can be presented graphically, if one assumes that N is sufficiently large for X ∼ N (0, σ 2 X I N ). All the realizations x will be almost uniformly distributed on the surface of a sphere with a radius of Nσ 2 X with probability close to one. 5 For the above AWGN channel, the noise will create a sphere of ambiguity around the communicated sequence x(m) with the radius Nσ 2 Z that is schematically shown in Figure 3 (a). The noisy realizations y with be located on the surface of this sphere. Under the proper codebook construction, the MMSE estimate should ensure the presence of a unique x(m) in the sphere of radius Nσ 2 X|Y around y. In the classical digital communications, this requirement is easily met by constraining the rate of source using optimal source coding, which minimizes source reconstruction distortion for a given rate, and by selecting a proper codebook of channel code for the specified statistics of the energy constrained channel ‡ . In robust hashing, the situation is inherently different due to the inability to control the rate of the source that is defined by nature. Moreover, the source output serves directly as an input to the channel, whose distribution is not necessarily optimal for the specified channel statistics. A similar situation can be also considered for the sphere packing counterpart of the above considered coding framework that is presented in Figure 3 (b) and corresponds to another interpretation of (3) 
in the form of I(X; Y ) = h(Y ) − h(Y |X).
In this case, the restriction is coming from the number of spheres of radius Nσ 2 Z concentrated around all possible codewords that can be packed into the sphere of radius N (σ 2 X + σ 2 Z ). Obviously, under the above conditions many codewords will be located within the sphere of ambiguity and can not be distinguished. 
Average probability of error
We will continue the analysis of theoretical limits of robust hashing algorithms by a performance analysis of robust hashing in terms of average probability of error. First, we will provide the analysis in the direct domain that goes along the line of classical communications and then extend it to the domain of random projections.
The average probability of error is defined as:
i.e., that the decoded indexm is not equal to the true index m, with P e|x(m) to be the probability of error for the codeword x(m), which is computed according to: ‡ It will be shown below that it is also equivalent to satisfying the proper minimum distance between codewords in the codebook.
where R c m is the complementary decision region for the codeword x(m). This decision region is defined as:
where the sets D m,n = {y : p Y|X (y|x(m)) ≤ p Y|X (y|x(n))}, m, n = {1, · · · , M} m = n correspond to the maximum likelihood (ML) decision region for the case of two codewords. We will also define the corresponding pairwise error probability of falsely accepting x(n) instead of x(m) as
The exact average probability of error can be computed as 19 :
It is also useful to introduce the bounds on the above probability of error and investigate the identification performance in terms of minimum distance among the codewords for a given codebook. In particular, using the maximum pairwise probability and union bound, one can show that the probability of error P e|x(m) in (6) can be bounded as: max
For the AWGN channel, the pairwise error probability can be computed as 19 :
where d m,n = x(m) − x(n) is the distance between two codewords x(m) and x(n).
Assuming the symmetric construction of the codebook and the worst case distance among all codewords to be d min = min m =n x(m) − x(n) , one can combine (11) with (10) and substitute them to (6) to introduce the bounds on the average probability of error:
Assuming Q dm,n 2σZ ≤ Q dmin 2σZ , the bounds on the average probability of error finally can be reduced to:
Therefore, the average probability of error is determined by the worst case distance. Similarly to the analysis presented in the previous section for the achievable identification rate, there is no possibility to control and actually maximize x 2 in (9) or d min in (13) for the fixed M and N by the best codebook construction as in the digital communication since all codewords are generated by the source (natural randomness) with the statistical distribution defined by nature and their number is only limited by the source entropy.
IDENTIFICATION RATE AND PROBABILITY OF ERROR AFTER BINARY FEATURE EXTRACTION
In this section, we will consider the setup presented in Figure 2 using key-dependent mapping as defined in (1):
We will try to introduce a formal approach to the random projections considered by Fridrich, 7 Mihcak et. al.,
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F. Lefebvre and B. Macq. 12 Instead of following a particular consideration of mapping W, we will assume that W is a random matrix. The matrix W, that is known as random projector, has elements w i,j that are generated from some specified distribution. L × N random matrices W whose entries w i,j are independent realizations of Gaussian random variables W i,j ∼ N (0, 1 N ) represent a particular interest for our study. In this case, such a matrix can be considered as an orthoprojector, for which WW
The performed above analysis of identification capacity and probability of error concerns the so-called direct domain where the decision about the codeword index is deduced directly using the N -length sequences. Contrarily, practically all robust hashing algorithms use the above dimensionality reduction (1) thus converting all pairs of sequences (x, y) into the projections (x,ỹ). In this section, we will demonstrate that the mutual information between the projected sequences is now redefined asR id = L N I(X;Ỹ ) andR id ≤ C id , with equality if and only if the transformation is invertible. Since that is not obviously the case for most of dimensionality reduction or feature extraction transforms where L << N, one is additionally facing the loss in performance in terms of maximum amount of uniquely distinguishable sequences. It should be pointed out that an extra loss is coming from the binarization stage that results in R BSC id for the binary sequence representation.
Identification rate and probability of error in random projection domain
According to the definition of identification capacity (3), we will consider the transformation of random vectors X = WX andỸ = WY that results into the identification rate:
For the Gaussian assumptions considered aboveX ∼ N (0, σ
, the identification rate in the random projections domain is:
Therefore, the dimensionality reduction transform W based on orthoprojector introduces a loss proportional to the ratio of signal dimensions after and before projection, i.e., L N . The average probability of error (9) will be the same with the only replacement of norm x = x 2 bỹ
The bounds on the average probability of error in the direct domain (13) can be readily rewritten for the random projections domain as:
is the worst case squared distance among all pairs of codewords. Moreover, in the case of orthoprojection (WW T = I L ), it reduces tod
Therefore, it is important to point out that the distance between the codewords in the random projections domain has reduced from d min tod min , andd min ≤ d min .
To introduce the bounds on the norm x 2 and distanced 2 we will use the Johnson-Lindenstrauss lemma, 10 which states that with high probability the geometry of a point cloud is not disturbed by certain Lipschitz mappings onto a space of dimension logarithmic in the number of points. In particular, some existing proofs of the lemma show that the mapping W can be taken as a linear mapping represented by an L × N matrix whose entries are randomly drawn from certain probability distributions. More particularly, M vectors in the Euclidean space can be projected down to L = O(ζ −2 log 2 M ) dimensions while incurring a distortion of at most 1 + ζ in their pairwise distances, where 0 < ζ < 1. In principle, this can be achieved by a dense L × N matrix and such a mapping takes O(N log 2 M ) (for fixed ζ). We refer interested readers to 1 for more details. § Otherwise, one can apply special orthogonalization techniques to ensure perfect orthogonality.
According to the Johnson-Lindenstrauss result, 10 one can approximate the effect of the random orthoprojector W as:
(
Thus, with high probability one can approximate (17) as follows:
Therefore, the random projections introduce a loss in the norm of projected codewords and distance between them proportional to L N that also reflects the corresponding loss in terms of achievable identification rate.
Identification rate and probability of error after binarization
The next step in binary feature extraction according to Figure 2 corresponds to the binarization. In this section, we will consider binarization based on sign random projections introduced by (2) . The link between the binary representation b x of vector x and its noisy counterpart b y of vector y is defined according to the binary symmetric channel (BSC) model. It is assumed that noise in the direct domain might cause a bit flipping in the binary domain with a certain average probabilityP b . The corresponding identification rate can be readily found as 5 :
where
is the binary entropy.
The bit error probability indicates the mismatch of signs betweenx i andỹ i , i.e., Pr[sign(x i ) = sign(ỹ i )]. For a given vector x and defined projection vector w i , one can find the probability of bit error as:
or by symmetry as:
For a givenx i and Gaussian assumption about the noise, the distribution of the projected vector isỸ i ∼ N (x i , σ 
Thus, the average bit error probability is:
with the statistics of projectionX i ∼ N (0, σ 2 X ). Remarkably, the average probability of error depends on the correlation coefficient between the direct domain data and is completely determined by the channel and source statistics. Similar results are also confirmed by McCarthy et. al. 17 and Doets and Lagendijk 6 for audio hashing based on binary fingerprinting method proposed in.
8
Summarizing the above consideration, one can conclude that the identification rate deceases with each stage of processing C id ≥R id ≥ R BSC id that is obviously a source of serious restriction. To avoid such kind of ambiguity, it is well known according to the Shannon channel coding theorem that the number of codewords M should be restricted to M ≤ 2 NC id .
5
Therefore, there does not exist any robust hashing algorithm in the considered decoding sense able to reliably distinguish more codewords than is allowed by the identification capacity. The same conclusions are valid for the average probability of error.
Therefore, there is a high demand in solutions capable to resolve the above problem. We envision two possible solutions:
• Solution 1: list decoding when more than one index is allowed to be produced by a system; in this case, the task is to ensure that the correct index is always on a list, i.e., to minimize a probability of miss while controlling a list size; • Solution 2: side information assisted hashing when the decoder produces only one index but it has an access to some side information that resolve the ambiguity created by the channel; in this paper, we will concentrate on this solution.
SIDE INFORMATION ASSISTED ROBUST PERCEPTUAL HASHING
As it was shown above for both identification capacity and average probability of error, the only way to decrease the probability of error for a single candidate decoder is to reduce the number of codewords in the codebook (or actually to expurgate the codewords with the smallest distance up to the limit defined by the identification capacity). This approach, typically used in the digital communications, is not acceptable for the content identification/authentication due to the main requirement to avoid collisions for M > 2 NC id .
Binary Feature Extraction That is why, we advocate an alternative approach based on side information for collision-free robust hashing (Solution 2 above). This approach is essentially inspired by Slepian-Wolf distributed source coding 21 and schematically presented for the binary data in Figure 4 . The basic idea behind this approach consists in the partitioning (binning) of the entire codebook in sets (bins) indexed by s. The bin index s, considered as the side information, is communicated to the decoder, which makes the decision about a particular sequence index m matched with the binary data B y within the bin s. For the binary data 1 ≤ s ≤ 2
and the corresponding codebook design is shown in Figure 4(b) . The efficient practical implementation of this theoretical decoding can be achieved using low-density parity check (LDPC) codes.
A similar interpretation can be introduced for the Gaussian data (considered in Section 2) that is shown in Figure 5 . The codewords shown in the upper part of Figure 5 can not be uniquely distinguished in the presence of noise. However, one can easily distinguish all of them (given that the number of codewords does not exceed 2 NC id ) by knowing that the codewords belong to the certain set indexed by s. To achieve this goal, one can label the codewords in several groups (in this particular example 3) with the index s that are represented by triangles, circles and squares. Given the index s, one performs the identification by the ML decoding in the direct or random projections domains. 
Summarizing the above consideration, one needs to compensate H(X|Y ) loss in I(X; Y ) = H(X) − H(X|Y )
by providing this side information via some auxiliary channel to the decoder. The main question is how to provide this side information. In our belief, it is highly determined by a particular application and here we will provide only some examples:
1. Content identification:
• Content based image retrieval (CBIR) systems: the codebook construction can be considered based on binning with the index s provided in the form of text annotations about the groups or categories such as for example, people, trees, animals, vehicles, nature, etc.; it is important to note that the clustering, typically required by the existing CBIR systems (that naturally disappears with the growth of the codebook cardinality), is not needed in the advocated approach; the samples from different groups can be mixed and overlapped in the direct space; additionally, the system can provide the list of indexes on the output contrarily to strict identification; other modalities can be used as the side information; • DNA/RNA sequence and mass spectrometry protein identification: the entire database is partitioned into groups according to the domain specific classification; • Brand protection (item identification, tracking and tracing): the item identification features (e.g., microstructure images) are partitioned into the bins according to some classification information such as for example serial number, date of production, country of destination, etc.; • Multimedia identification: image, audio, video content identification is based on the robust hashing but the index of set s is communicated to the decoder as the hidden watermark; it should be pointed out the main difference with the known schemes such as for example proposed by Fridrich 7 where the hash is stored as a watermark as opposed to what is considered in the paper; 2. Content authentication:
• Authentication architectures are designed in the similar way as identification with the only difference that consists in the providing additional authentication information to the decision device about the sequence index m within the set specified by the index s. In the authentication applications it is also known as common randomness extraction 2 and practically used in various architectures as reported in.
RESULTS OF COMPUTER MODELING
In this section, we will first demonstrate the loss in performance due to the dimensionality reduction and binarization for both identification rate and average probability of error. In the second part of modeling, we will highlight the impact of side information on the average probability of error for the Gaussian and binarized data.
We will start with the demonstration of loss in performance introduced by the different signal processing transformations in the procedure of robust hash computation. For this, we present identification capacity C id (3) and identification ratesR id (15) Figure 6 (a). As expected, the achievable rate decreases with each stage of processing. The first rate loss from the direct domain to the random projections domain is caused by the dimensionality reduction and is proportional to L N . The second rate loss is additionally caused by the mapping of real data into binary counterparts. It is evident that for errorless identification, one should satisfy the condition M ≤ 2 NC id and since C id ≥R id ≥ R BSC id , the number of uniquely distinguishable sequences is reducing with each stage of hash computation.
To demonstrate the same impact on the average probability of error, we investigated the average probability of error in the direct domain, after sequential dimensionality reduction and binarization. The results of this study are presented in Figure 6 (b). At the first stage, the average probability of error for the direct domain was computed according to the exact formula (9), upper bound (12) and experimentally simulated by averaging over 10 randomly generated Gaussian codebooks of size M = 2 3 and length N = 1024 with σ 2 X = 1 under 50000 random noise realizations. The average minimum distance was estimated to be d min = 43. At the second stage, the same simulations were performed for the randomly projected data with L = 128 that are shown in the same Figure. The average minimum distance wasd min = 15. Both theoretical exact formula and upper bound on the average probability of error as well as the experimental results confirm the conclusion about the distance decrease proportional to L/N that causes the corresponding deterioration of performance. At the final stage, the randomly projected data were binarized thus preserving its dimensionality L = 128 and the experimentally computed average probability of error is presented to characterize the identification performance based on binary (hard) hashed values. These results are in the good match with the corresponding performance in terms of achievable identification rate. 10 and length N = 1024 with σ 2 X = 1 under 50000 random noise realizations. The curve with label "0 bit" corresponds to the case when no side information is used for the identification in both direct and binary domains, i.e., the rate of side information is R si = 0, and the rest of curves indicate the graduate increase in the side information up to 6 bits. The codebook was partitioned onto 2
Rsi bins during simulation with the random allocation of codewords. The same simulation was also performed for the binary codebooks obtained by the random projections and binarization with L = 128 of the the previous Gaussian codebooks. In both cases, the presence of side information makes possible to decrease the average probability of error with the SNR gain about 2.5 dB.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the fundamental restrictions of basic robust perceptual hashing algorithms based on dimensionality reduction and binarization in the identifications setup. Based on the well-known communication results we have linked the identification setup with the identification capacity and demonstrated the maximum number of uniquely identifiable sequences without any processing. Then we showed the gradual decrease of this number with each stage of hash computation as well as presented the accuracy of identification in terms of average probability of error. Due to the inherent necessity to identify larger number of sequences than those enabled by the identification capacity and taking into account the above loss due to dimensionality reduction and binarization in the hash computation, we suggested two possible solutions based on the list decoding and side information assisted hashing that was the subject of our study. The results of computer simulation performed for both Gaussian random codebooks and binary hashes demonstrate the positive impact of side information on the performance enhancement. In part of future research, we will concentrate on the alternative approach based on list decoding and compare the results with those obtained in this paper. 
